Relying on a powerful collective narrative through which political, legal and social decision-making is guided in the name of science, the authority of scientific experts reaches beyond the boundaries of their certified knowledge base. Therefore, expertise constitutes and is constituted by transgressive competence. The author argues that (1) changes in the decisionmaking structure of liberal Western democracies and changes in the knowledge production system diminish the authority of scientific expertise while increasing the context-dependency of expertise -thereby altering the nature of its predictive claims; (2) the societal distribution of expertise, while displaying emancipatory features of empowerment of citizens, also raises issues of quality control; and (3) in order to regain a balance between public and private, i.e. individual-based societally distributed expertise, future expert systems will need to adopt a longer time-perspective. The author also reflects on directions in which future expert systems might evolve.
and counter-experts took part in a prolonged experiment which brought them together in face-to-face contact in a repeated series of meetings. One of the many interesting results of this consensus-seeking dialogue was that experts and counter-experts followed the rules of scientific discourse to an astonishing degree. They agreed in their argumentation to separate 'facts' from 'values' and reached consensus about what was not known. This consensus and the arguments on which it rested vanished quickly, however, once the face-to-face interaction came to an end and the normal reality of public discourse in the presence of the media took over (van den Daele, 1996) .
What is interesting in this and other examples is to ask about the conditions under which scientific expertise operates and what produces different outcomes. Expertise claims to rest upon objective scientific knowledge, yet being contested has almost become an essential characteristic. What is it in the style as much as in the content of the narrative in which expert knowledge is publicly expressed, that seeks to persuade that it knows the answers and can come up with conclusions for action to be taken? What is its persuasive hold on a future that is unknown? The paradox expertise presents is apparent: never has scientific expertise been so prevalent and indispensable before, while being embattled at the same time. It is simultaneously used as the hallmark of science-based reasoning, for rubber-stamped recommendations of 'science says, it is good -or badfor you' issued to consumers and citizens, and as a highly prized political resource for legitimating contrary views. Its narrative and substantive arguments seem to change according to the context in which they are deployed. One example of official expertise being contested in retrospect is provided by Brian Wynne (1996) in his account of Cumbrian sheep-farmers in the wake of the Chernobyl radiation disaster. In this case study Wynne analyses the relationship between the understanding and expertise of the farmers and that of the official bodies who were attempting to control the sale and movement of radiation-contaminated sheep. Wynne sheds light on the complex factors affecting credibility of experts and trust in scientific expertise. The sheep-farmers were never given the opportunity to articulate their misgivings about the government's experts in public.
Their beliefs on what would have been a sound way of proceeding -mirroring a scientific belief system in an exemplary way -remained impotent in a context in which they were officially ignored. It was not until they could voice their discontent to sympathetic social scientists, ready and eager to interpret their narrative as an equally valid pool of expert knowledge, that they acquired the status of counter-experts. In the case cited above, the favourable conditions that enabled the free flow of scientific reasoning and argumentation quickly came to a halt, once the situation was no longer that of a face-to-face interaction among experts and counter-experts, but a return to 'normal' conditions under which scientific knowledge is disputed in public controversies. In the presence of the media as self-appointed representatives of the public, decisive shifts in tone, rhetoric, argumentation and content take place, with which the respective narratives of experts and counter-experts are articulated. Expertise is scientifically without foundation, van den Daele maintains. Experts claim more than they do know and can prove, and they also make judgments about values. They decide which action is considered appropriate in a given situation. Their mandate is a political one and it remains so, as long as expertise is not contested (van den Daele, 1996) . Does persuasion depend on not being challenged?
As a narrative expertise contains both a context-related and a temporal dimension. It claims to possess knowledge about a variety of practices and their effects situated in concrete contexts. It also claims knowledge about the links between the practices of the past with those of the future. Since the future is uncertain, it is in the present where knowledge about past practices and their effects are brought to bear in order to shape the practices of the future in accordance with what expertise claims to know about them. This happens through decisionmaking. Expertise is therefore potentially as embracing as the practices to which it relates. And the links between the practices of the past and those of the future, both imagined and constructed to some degree, become crucial in a present which always seeks to command action with the urgency of the immediate. Whether the seemingly compelling evidence of the now is followed depends on existing decision-making arrangements and structures which may solicit, use or ignore expertise. They provide the scene in which the narratives of expertise are enacted and determine the audience before which the narratives will seek to persuade.
It may therefore be useful to retrace the historical trajectory that the relationship between expertise and decision-making has taken, choosing as points of reference the process of modernity in the making and to highlight the changes that have taken place since.
Expertise and Decision-making in Early Modernity
Early modernity, whatever else its predicaments, did not see itself as the outcome of any decision-making process. The large-scale societal and economic transformations that swept through the lives of individuals, communities and societies and which came to stand for modernization, were initially perceived as being akin to natural forces, unleashed in an unpredictable way with outcomes that could not be influenced. They were seen as resembling natural laws. Industrialization, urbanization and the uprooting of collective and individual identities that accompanied them were widely interpreted by contemporaries to be the work of impersonal natural forces that left little room for shaping destinies other than accommodation to suffering, opportunism or progressivist entrepreneurialism (Nowotny, 1991) . Even later, when some of the tangible benefits of modernization's sweep through European societies had become more visible, with railroads and electricity lines extending to remote rural villages, this was hardly seen as the result of anyone's decision. Nor was the later introduction of telephones into the premises of the business world, the homes of the urban bourgeoisie and the offices of the state bureaucracy interpreted as the outcome of a consensus-seeking discourse or the result of a conscious act of adopting a new technology. Rather, the introduction of new technologies and the accompanying changes in social practices and attitudes were seen as manifestations of the forces of progress at work. They originated from the increasingly visible innovative effectiveness and eminent practical usefulness of science and technology. They spread in accordance with prevailing social hierarchies of class, status and economic power and in co-evolution with the relentless expansion of the nation state and its inbuilt centralizing tendencies. Whatever discontents there were with progress as the prime moving force -and modernity spawned many, articulated by a sophisticated literary and social elite of intellectuals -decision-making or partaking in a process seeking a consensual basis, for shaping technology or foreseeing its consequences, were not among their concerns.
The dominant view, or rather the common blind spot, largely exonerated science and technology by placing them outside the societal realm. But already at the turn of the century modernity manifested itself clearly also in the readiness to intervene and, at least partly, to influence the outcome of scientific and technological developments. This can be seen by looking at the public images of science and technology as they were construed and conveyed through the daily press in the first decades of this century. In a recent study Ulrike Felt, my collaborator in Vienna, has analysed these public images as represented in the print media in Vienna in the period between 1900 and 1938 (Felt, 1997) . The reading public covered a wide political spectrum. It was invited to admire and witness the dazzling achievements of science and technology. Four main recurrent images can be distinguished that told how science and technology were seen to affect the lives and beliefs of the public. One image concerns the relationship between science and the nation, a kind of precursor to the theme of international competitiveness of today. Although science and technology were seen as being international, there existed a keen sense for the relative achievements or lack of progress between the major European nations. Science and technology were an important indicator for the standing, prestige and power of a nation. The second image, which came in recurring and different variants, emphasized the mastery of nature. More and improved attempts had to be undertaken to understand nature better, in order to intervene, control and manipulate. These two images, with their emphasis on practical utility, their modernistic ring but also nationalistic undertones, were accompanied by two more reflexive ones. The third recurring image oscillated between two seemingly contradictory strands of how to approach scientific discoveries and wonders. One approach stressed the rationality of science, its universalism and the principal reproducibility of scientific knowledge. The other highlighted what were interpreted to be the more intangible, wondrous and even mystical features of the new scientific discoveries. The fourth image emerged from and reflected upon the recent scientific discoveries of the time in a different way. It voiced concerns with the growing complexity and formalization of science as evidenced in physics, deploring the loss of access and general intelligibility that go with it.
In these public images science and technology are represented as linked, although they were often treated separately. The pervasive attitude towards the authority of science is highly deferential. Technology, largely viewed as applications following from science and therefore never completely decoupled from it, was presented in a celebratory mood, highlighting the beauty and grandeur of these achievements. A utopian dimension of further progress and technological potential is evident. And although the ambivalence inherent in scientific and technological progress can already be sensed, possible fears are usually downplayed in ways which are reminiscent of Freud's analysis of the functions of humour. Nowhere in this fairly comprehensive source material, covering the public images of science and technology over almost four decades in the daily press, can any anticipatory traces of our present predicaments with the role of scientific and technical expertise in policy and decision-making be found. The painful struggle with scientific uncertainties, ranging over a growing number of environmental and health concerns, and the relentless pressure of a political process attempting to reach decisions that will command at least acceptance, if not consensus, of a sizeable part of the electorate, were simply absent. So were public controversies involving scientific-technologic issues or the treatment of scientific evidence in court, except in narrowly prescribed cases. The current groping attempts to reach international agreements in matters that have become of global environmental concern were non-existent. Modernity, or so it seemed, was still secure in its own foundations. It rested on the sense of control that it had achieved within the confines of the nation state and the role which science and technology had come to play as helping to secure visions of further material and social progress.
And yet modernity was not without decision-making structures and decisionmakers. Nor was it without scientific and technical expertise, which included a vast array of competences and skills, many of which were in the service of the expansion and growth of the nation state itself. Nation states were in competition with each other, the recourse to force and overt aggression vying with economic prowess and the achievement of superiority as an industrialized nation. Railroads and other large-scale technological systems were not only in need of the most advanced technology but of heavy financial investments as well, often coming from capital sources located abroad. Bankruptcies and other economic collapses were the familiar dark sides of alternating cycles of economic boom which inspired, among others, Durkheim's analysis of social anomie. Strategic calculations had to be made and risks were taken in other areas as well. The rise of the welfare state with its widening provisions of social security drew heavily on the expertise of statisticians and actuarians; probability theory came to be widely used. The building of bridges and high-rise housing and the widespread use of machinery in manufacturing went hand in hand with a strengthening of safety regulations and their controls. International conventions to reach a certain standardization of measurements boomed, as did their national counterparts in extending their regulatory and administrative rule. The expansion of the continental European nation states into diverse areas that became subject to state control and regulation could only proceed with the unflinching support of civil servants and other professional groups linked to the state which enabled this expansion through the professional competence and the scientific and technical expertise these groups could offer. Higher education was restructured in order to meet the growing demand in technical and economic competence and expertise, thus broadening the basis of the traditional disciplines civil servants were drawn from. As the example of the grandes écoles in France shows, the culture of scientific and technical expertise in service of the state became a more general, although varied, pattern in continental Europe. Was scientific and technical expertise then the answer to the modern nation state's search to expand and strengthen its rule? Its dominant narrative took the form of an allegedly impersonal bureaucracy accompanied by the rise of the technocratic expert as an important figure in public life. Theodor Porter rightly reminds us that an underlying tension characterized the cult of objectivity to which experts aspired. At one end of the continuum the trust in numbers and the ideal of mechanical objectivity were espoused, while at the other end the personal expert judgment as embodied and represented by the professionals and their standards reigned supreme (Porter, 1995) . But in both cases, whether expertise was closer located to the pole of the professions striving for greater autonomy or nearer to the pole of the impersonal rule of the bureaucratic expert, it remained defined through its relationship to the modern state. The relative autonomy that the professions came to enjoy in some countries was counterweighed by their closer integration into the state bureaucracy in others. In both cases experts became the nation state's modernizing agents, actively engaged in shaping the practice of its future. The link between past and future was anchored in the grand narrative of the modernization project itself.
But scientific and technical expertise and the know-how of social engineering did not emerge on their own from diverse fields of practice. They were carefully nourished, certified, controlled and transmitted through the highly regulated hierarchies and networks that linked the institutions of higher learning, professional societies and corporate associations with the state's regulatory, legal and institutional frameworks. The state retained its monopoly of certification and with it, that of quality control. However privileged the relative autonomy of some professions might appear, an elaborate body of rules, regulating access and content and specifying the conditions under which expertise could be exercised or was required to be exercised, provided the cocoon in which professional expertise could develop its butterfly wings. It was a cocoon that it could never leave completely behind, though. For the modern state, professional experts -those modelled after the liberal professions and those modelled after the impersonal state bureaucratic ideal -were the indispensable partners in the process of modernization. Their loyalty was double, but proceeded in synchronicity: the overall goals and questions to be addressed were framed by the projects of modernization; best practice, expert judgment and the professional standards of operating came from the professions. But there was a third, although less visible, commitment that enhanced the standing of scientific and technical expertise as such a powerful ally in the process of modernization.
The third element was the knowledge base as it became organized inside the universities in the later half of the 19th century, namely the predominantly disciplinary structure of scientific and technical knowledge production inside academia. While best practice or the state of the art of scientific-technical expertise refers to a field of practice in which standards have to be adjusted continuously or set anew, it was the disciplinary structure of knowledge productioncalled mode 1 -that served as supreme scientific authority, governed by scientific elites who were ultimately also in charge of quality control . The official rhetoric of the division of pure and applied science greatly strengthened and reinforced the rule of mode 1 of knowledge production, even in areas seemingly remote like that of professional expertise. In ultimately subjecting all forms of applied scientific and technical knowledge to the authority of discipline-based pure science, the latter became in fact removed from all areas of potential contestation. Faults, if they arose, were attributable to practitioners, who had erred in applying the knowledge that science had put at their disposal. In order to appreciate the authority that science was able to command at the height of modernity -an authority that was grounded in and legitimated by the epistemological status it enjoyed -it is important to see the social space that was created around it. Science and technology had become major allies of the nation state's modernization projects. Scientific and technical expertise served as the practical arm for expanding the role of the nation state and for helping to consolidate it. Accountability existed within the framework of the accountability of professional experts, while science -understood as pure science in the sense of mode 1 knowledge production -was not accountable to anyone. In so far as the dominant narratives of scientific and technical expertise succeeded in sharing the uncontestable authority of science, it was evidence for their correct application of scientific principles. Whenever expertise failed, the very failure, since it was seen as being due to misguided or erroneous application, reinforced the uncontestability of the authority of science.
The Rise of the Individual Rational Decision-maker
The contrast with late modernity could hardly be greater. The present situation is characterized, as Sheila Jasanoff and others have pointed out, by the pervasive role of scientific arguments in structuring everyday social choices, such as people's eating habits, medical treatment and life styles; the use of technical evidence and its impact on trust and social cohesion; and the charges of emotive and irrational public responses to issues represented in scientific or technical terms (Jasanoff, 1997) . But the contrast is not only due to the vast increase of scientific and technological knowledge and the feasibility of unprecedented forms of intervention, control and manipulation of nature. The present predicaments would be unthinkable were it not for the historically equally unprecedented rise of the individual, for whom decision-making faced by an ever changing and explosive array of options has become the hallmark of his or her existence. Without much exaggeration one could say that the individual today is defined through the sequence of decisions which, in their contingency, make up his or her identity. It is the seemingly inevitable ascendancy of the individual, usually presumed to be a rational decision-maker, which is crucial today: it is a presupposition for the functioning of the market and supported through its mechanisms, while in turn vindicating its efficiency. In this model, the individual is construed as an active participant in his or her dual role as informed and information-seeking consumer and citizen. Privileging so strongly the rational individual as decision-maker has implications for the ways in which collective decisions are reached, their implementation and the kind of legitimacy they enjoy. Here lies one of the principal reasons why scientific and technical expertise has become distributed throughout society and in the course of this diffusion to some extent privatized (Ezrahi, 1994) . Decision-making is no longer seen as densely compacted into the centralized and hierarchical structure of a state bureaucracy, other administrative units or institutional clusters. It has become disembedded from the centralized structural matrix of modernity in which it had been nested before. If late modernity espouses the individual as the basis for decision-making who in principle at least has access to all the information required, then expertise also becomes a highly individualized commodity. In the fluidity of information exchange and ever new options to be decided upon, expertise also becomes a fluid configuration of knowledge, information and situated experience, all of which are apt to change in response to questions arising in highly specific and localized contexts. It is the strength of weak ties, as Granovetter called it in the 1970s, which has won out over the strong ties of a modernity that believed in centralization. The stage is therefore set for everyone to become an expert in something of concern to him-or herself.
This kind of widespread and diffused expertise, linked to a highly decentralized and individualized decision-making structure, does in itself not yet replace the culture of public expertise, backed by professional standards and scientific authority. But it is easy to see how distributed individual expertise gains in collective strength through the fact that it is distributed throughout society, hence the spread of potential connections to other sites of expertise. Once the private expertise of many individuals has become manifest in public, their combination may come to form a kind of public expertise. Typically, this transition from private to public expertise is always mediated expertise: through the media and public opinion, through various organized bodies and committees, through social movements or self-help groups, through political processes that seek wider public participation, through discussion groups on the internet or more traditional channels of political association, lobbying or interest articulation. They can all be mobilized to tap the widely dispersed private expertise of individuals in order to furnish the raw material for public expertise to emerge in contested areas and issues. This is one of the roots of the paradox surrounding scientific and technical expertise in the present. More expertise is needed and demanded, as well as readily produced by the myriads of individual decision-makers, while the offer in publicly available and certified expertise tends to lag behind, since publicly available expertise does not, and cannot, equal the sum of all private expertise. It therefore cannot fulfil the expectations that await it, since its links to private experience and expertise remain unpredictable, volatile, fragmented and diverse. In the process of liberating itself from its previous ties that bound it to the public realm and to the centralized decision-making structures of modernity, expertise has become disembedded. Hence the growth of discontent in the interstices between private and public. Where public expertise is expected to mirror the individual's private experience and expertise, it must disappoint many, while satisfying few.
This may sound like a somewhat exaggerated view of the transformation that expertise underwent in the course of the processes of change from the heights of modernity to the present situation. But it is important to highlight the role played in this transformation by the model of the individual, rational and informed decision-maker. In today's narrative of expertise this character has come to play a central role. Scientific and technical knowledge are expected to inform him or her about which choices to make. The greater the options, the more information is needed, while at the same time, criteria are being sought which reduce this information's complexity in order to become manageable. The market and the political process collude to offer procedures for doing so by putting at the disposal of the individual many entry points for further contestation and mobilization, for action and appeal. Once the monolithic decision-making structure of modernity had to give way to individual participation and choice, it also became evident that liberal Western democracies depended upon the continuous necessity of negotiating consensus, even in areas that previously were thought not to lend themselves to compromise. This is where the public authority of science enters, together with its present contestation and decline.
A Socially Distributed System of Knowledge Production
In early modernity a strong, although largely hidden, link existed between scientific and technical expertise and the disciplinary structure of scientific knowledge production. This link, while permitting professional expertise to partake in and to derive its authority from the yet uncontested public authority of science, served at the same time as a protective layer for science. Later changes in the way that scientific knowledge is produced have also affected the public authority of science. My colleagues and I have identified changes in knowledge production as what we call the rise of mode 2 alongside mode 1 knowledge production . Very briefly, the key change is that knowledge production is becoming less and less a self-contained activity. As practised currently, it is neither the science of the universities, nor the technology of industry. It is no longer the preserve of a special type of institution from which knowledge is expected to spill over, or spin off, to the benefit of other sectors. Knowledge production, not only in its theories and models but in its methods and techniques, has spread from academia to many different types of institutions. It is in this sense that knowledge production has become a socially distributed process. At its base lies the expansion and heterogeneity of the number of sites, which form the sources for a continual combination and recombination of knowledge resources. The socially distributed knowledge production system which we call mode 2 has a number of characteristics.
There are an increasing number of sites where recognizably competent research is being carried out. This can easily be demonstrated by consulting the addresses of the authors of scientific publications, though change is taking place so rapidly that the full extent of the social distribution of knowledge production is probably no longer fully captured by the printed word (Hicks and Katz, 1996) . These sites interact with one another, and thereby broaden the base of effective interaction. Thus contributions to the stock of knowledge are derived from an increasing number of various types of institutions. The dynamics of socially distributed knowledge production lie in the flows of knowledge and in the shifting patterns that make up connectivity among these flows. The connections move with the problem context rather than according either to disciplinary structures or to the exigencies of national science policy. The number of interconnections is accelerating, so far apparently unchannelled by existing institutional structures, perhaps for the reason that these connections are intended to respond to problem definitions that arise in a concrete context of application. They survive only as long as they are useful, hence the often temporary structure of teams that make up a transdisciplinary working group. The new mode of knowledge production exhibits heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous, growth. New sites of knowledge production are continually emerging which, in their turn, provide intellectual points of departure for further combinations or configurations of researchers. In this sense, the socially distributed knowledge production system exhibits some of the properties often associated with self-organizing systems in which communication density is increasing rapidly.
While the emphasis has been put on the changes both in terms of the numbers of possible sites and their degrees of interactivity, they are linked to other dimensions of change (see Nowotny, 1999) . They include the increasing contextualization of knowledge, including its marketability, the blurring of boundaries between disciplines and institutions and across institutional boundaries, the funding of scientific careers, the transdisciplinarity of research, changes in the system of higher education, and the spread of modern communication and information technologies. There is also an increasing importance of hybrid fora, groups constituted from the interplay of experts and lay people as social actors, in the shaping of knowledge and the genuine production of new knowledge. All of this has implications for the management of the knowledge production process and for the maintenance of quality control within it.
Late Modernity and Its Discontents
A socially distributed knowledge production system has implications for scientific and technical expertise. Expertise has always been pragmatic and bound to European Journal of Social Theory 3(1) concrete contexts. In its narrative forms it has to link the practices of the past to the future and sustain these links by arguments. The contextual nature of these questions, their immediacy and practical concreteness remain a major challenge for experts. They have to draw on a stock of knowledge which is available at the very moment when the answer is needed for further action. The substantive ingredients of the narrative, however, the questions about which expertise is demanded, become less and less a choice of the experts, but are increasingly audience-driven. Roqueplo maintains that in producing expertise, scientists never respond to questions of their own choosing, contrasted with what they usually do in the process of research. Since the questions posed to them usually concern decisions in very concrete situations, this leads them by necessity to transgress the limits of their competence (Roqueplo, 1997: 36) . Therefore, strategies have to be developed by the experts in order to enlarge their knowledge base. This is done by mobilizing and tapping into what he calls 'immediate and reflexive interdisciplinarity'. Under the instant pressure to respond to what may be an acute crisis in decision-making -the most recent example being the frantic efforts by the UK and the European Commission to confront the questions raised by BSE -scientific experts have to bring together and to synthesize all the existing and relevant interdisciplinary knowledge. In 'coming together and reflecting' on the questions that confront them, experts again transgress the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge and the constraints of their own limits of knowledge. This is similar to knowledge production in mode 2, where transdisciplinarity is achieved by focusing on the definition of research problems as they emerge in contexts of application and where the heterogeneity of those involved in knowledge production introduces criteria of assessment in addition to that of scientific quality alone.
The demands for scientific and technical expertise in a socially distributed knowledge production system differ from what research normally can provide. To take up Roqueplo's point, experts are asked to answer questions they have not chosen themselves. While researchers will try to reformulate questions in such a way that they become 'good', meaning scientifically answerable, experts have to draw on other resources. They might invoke statistical probabilities and accordingly differentiate the answers they give. But the main difference lies in the fact that experts, in contrast to researchers, are often under immense time pressure, since their answers form part of a political process feeding into a political agenda. Every concrete situation which demands to be analysed can be done so from many different angles. Hence, a kind of synthetic reconfiguration and re-contextualization of the knowledge available must take place, which fits different possible points of view and different disciplinary perspectives into an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary synthesis. The link to action and the possible consequences for policy recommendations frame the questions as well as the answers. In their narratives, experts have to act not only as if they knew the answers, but also the conditions under which the answers will fit in the future. Even if experts are not always conscious of this fact, it pervades their considerations of what is considered good scientific expertise. Narratives are one of the central ways in which the individual voices of experts are orchestrated to help produce more wide-ranging epistemic, social, political or legal authority. What does this analysis entail for the narratives of expertise? From a literary perspective Gillian Beer has pointed out that narrative in science as well as in literature implies teleology even when its argument denies it. It makes for an organization in which the future is already disposed and apparently under the control of the narrator's description. Narrative implies successful prediction (Beer, 1996: 165-6) . Bearing these characteristics in mind, I reach the conclusion that the narratives of expertise are transgressive and collective, and that its authority is distributed.
Narratives of expertise are transgressive in the sense that they must respond to issues and questions which are never only scientific and technical. The practices to which they refer are characterized by overlaps and interlinkages. Unpredictable 'seamless webs' hold them together, in which the various areas of societal life, technology, science, the law, values and politics are intermeshed. In order to be predictive, expertise has to claim that it understands the interlinkages that situate and bind the various relevant practices together. But narratives of expertise are also transgressive in another sense. They address an audience which never consists of scientists only. They have to develop an acute sense for different kinds of concerns, defences, wishes or anxieties and the experience that a mixed audience may have. The more audience-driven expertise becomes, with the media acting as one of the main drivers, the greater its transgressivity in trying to reach out and speak to diverse audiences.
Secondly, the narratives of expertise are told in a collective voice. In part, this follows from the limits of competence of the individual expert. These limitations call for a wider base, grounded in a collective pool of experts and expertise. Apart from their appearance in the media (which do not give star billing to committees), experts usually work by 'coming together and reflecting'. And if, as in the legal system, experts are called upon as individuals, they are supposed to represent the state of the art, and hence to testify in the name of collective rather than their own, individual expertise only. The narrative of expertise therefore speaks in a collective voice, but one that has to be orchestrated carefully to sound in unison to the maximum extent possible. Dissenting voices, if they have a sufficiently good case, are permitted to deviate in certain points, but are expected to share enough common ground to remain part of the collective. Organized as successful prediction, this is why the consensus of experts in delivering their expertise is so important. Collectively expressed expertise is addressed not primarily to other experts. Whenever experts succeed in speaking with one voice, a gain in authority is the result.
Thirdly, the scientific authority which the narrative has to convey has itself become societally distributed. This may be the least well understood characteristic of the narrative of expertise, since it seemingly contradicts the image of science speaking with one authoritative voice. Although to employ experts who have also a high scientific reputation may still be considered useful, the reputation of experts alone is a treacherous symbolic ground upon which to base the authority of expertise. Scientific and technical expertise is always open to contestation in circumstances never controlled by the experts alone. So where does the authority, which expertise nevertheless commands, come from? Since expertise has to bring together knowledge which is itself widely distributed, highly contextualized and heterogeneous, the authority of expertise arises not in one specific site, nor from what one scientific discipline or one group of highly respected researchers have to offer, but precisely from bringing together the many different and heterogeneous practice-related knowledge dimensions that are involved. The scientific authority of expertise resides in the links that bind it together in its highly distributed form. In this sense, scientific and technical expertise is selforganizing or perhaps self-authorizing. For the narrative to be predictive, it is precisely this successful self-authorization that has to come through.
If the narrative of expertise is transgressive, collective and self-authorizing, then these very characteristics are also the ones that make up its vulnerability to challenges coming from different sides. As public representations, which are observed, recorded and transmitted by the media, they are addressed to an audience, whose reaction is likely to affect the effectiveness of communication. Transgressivity is open to contestation, since by definition experts speak about matters that transcend their competence. Hence the recurrent, although futile, insistence on redrawing boundaries as a way to forestall their trespassing. 'If experts would only stick to what they responsibly can claim to fall within their competence, if they would only speak as scientists and not venture into values, politics or economics', is an exhortation that can still be heard frequently as a means to safeguard the authority of scientific expertise against charges of transgressivity. But the confusing complexity of issues in the social world has none of this. It has simply confounded and defeated repeated attempts at redrawing the boundaries once and for all.
Likewise, the collective nature of expertise can turn into a liability whenever the lonely voice of a few dissenting experts may win a case. The defeat of one opponent is in the nature of the game, the defeat of many by few tends to turn the defeat of the many into a great victory for the few. But the logic built into the narrative of expertise has many good reasons for wanting to err, if erring cannot be avoided, on the side of the majority. Thus, the narrative of expertise is likely to remain open to the occasional victory of the dissenting minority. But where trust in scientific experts is already low, the public may become even more convinced that none of the experts are to be believed, thus furthering the downward spiral of decline in trust. In a similar way, to rely too much on the authority of science can lead to further decline, when it turns out that only the outward symbols of scientific authority were used and that the emperor is naked. The narrative structure of expertise is therefore a forceful reminder that expertise is not only highly context-dependent, immediate and concrete, since these are the conditions for its production, but so is its power of persuasion. It is loaded with political and economic interests, deep value conflicts and often short-term in outlook. The distributed nature of the scientific authority of expertise makes for a precarious balance which has to be redressed and recalibrated on every new occasion.
Reflections on the Narratives of Expertise in the Future
Many thoughtful observers have made proposals for how the present liabilities of scientific and technical expertise can be overcome. But if, as this article has argued, the current discontents with the authority and effectiveness of scientifictechnical expertise are the combined result of two separate, although interrelated processes, this will not be easy. One process, linked to the rise of the rational and informed individual in the dual role of consumer and citizen, has led to what appear to be irreversible changes in the decision-making structures of liberal Western democracies. The other process, equally wide-ranging in impact and probably also irreversible, has led to the emergence of a societally distributed system of knowledge production, which is no longer confined to institutional monopolies or knowledge bases organized along strictly disciplinary lines. Even if it were the case, as Pestre argues, that mode 2 knowledge production is not new, but has always permeated the entire history of science (Pestre, 1996) , there can be doubt that mode 2 is for the first time openly acknowledged in its own right. The fact that knowledge production takes place in many different and heterogeneous sites and is distributed through society, elevates this interconnectivity and its inherent transdisciplinary tendencies to a powerful driving force in a heterogeneous growth pattern which cannot be reduced to 'mere application' of disciplinary research or to a simple transfer of knowledge (Nowotny, 1999) . A societally distributed system of knowledge production further increases the context dependence of expertise and its transgressivity, while putting into place a self-organizing, although precarious, system in which scientific authority itself becomes distributed.
To follow the transformation that the narrative of expertise has undergone from early to late modernity has also implied a crossing of domains. Originating in the public sphere, certified and regulated by the state, be it in the relative autonomy granted to the professions or in the ideal of a state bureaucracy bound to formal rules, scientific and technical expertise was an indispensable support for the expansion of state rule and regulations. But the authority of expertise, while harnessed and regulated by the state, was not of the state. Rather, it spoke in the name of nature, in the unequivocal public voice of science. When scientific and technical expertise entered increasingly the private lives of individuals as consumers and citizens, the public voice of science was confronted with private innuendoes and the voices of citizens organized as interest groups or lobbies. These different forms of localized and particularized experience and expertise emanating from the private sphere have now to be coordinated in public and given an authority which transcends the aggregate of the individuals involved. To a certain extent, this process involves the de-professionalization of expertise and a reappropriation of expertise through lay participants. At this stage, science becomes also known as citizen science, advocacy or participatory science, indicating its willingness to accommodate to the new situation.
Despite the emancipatory features of the process of partial privatization of expertise, manifest in shedding an all too deferential attitude towards science and in asking that it should also be open to public demands and expectations, the process of societal diffusion of expertise is not without its own problematic. At its root is the issue of quality control. In the end and regardless of how it is arrived at, scientific and technical expertise should be right in order to be effective. Its predictive power can and will be assessed, at least in retrospect. But the number of those who now judge the effectiveness of expertise and who assess whether the right decisions have been taken, has been widened considerably. Like in mode 2 knowledge production, scientific quality alone is no longer a sufficient criteria, even if it remains a high-priority criteria. Additional criteria of quality control enter. They depend on the context and the questions asked and who has been involved. This heterogeneity makes quality control an urgent and largely unresolved issue. There is no realistic chance for any kind of scientific body or advisory committee to reassert their claims to a monopolistic control of scientific authority. Nor can the scientific elites control the potentially open-ended demands for expertise and its inherent transgressivity.
What can be done then? What might a future expert system look like? Roqueplo (1997: 41) , for instance, proposes to instal groups of pluridisciplinary experts on a permanent basis. The procedure of arriving at a reflexive interdisciplinarity would be as important as the product of the experts' deliberation. The reflexive dimension would assure that all recognize the bias inherent in scientific expertise and its potential for conflict. Thus, a permanent public debating space would be opened, with confrontation as a central and productive element. The institutionalization of such an expert system would assure more long-term views and would thus be less vulnerable to the risks of immediacy and time pressure. But ultimately such an expert system may not go far enough to answer to some of the discontents this paper has analysed.
If the socially distributed knowledge production system of mode 2 has implications for scientific and technical expertise, a future system of expertise must recognize this by becoming more inclusive. The basis of knowledge and expertise must somehow transcend the narrow institutional confines of what are traditionally considered science-producing institutions. To be viable in the twenty-first century, the future of expertise must rely on both its public and private forms, beginning with experiments on how the two might be reconciled. In the space for debate which indeed needs to be created, lay participants and their experience should receive a recognized place (under this perspective it was an even more regrettable error to close down the OTA [in the United States], so much admired in Europe). Such an expert system also has to create and nourish a truly pluridisciplinary knowledge base, which ultimately should transform into a transdisciplinary way of working. This is also the point where the time dimension enters. Immediacy of response can only be handled if an expert system adopts a long-term time perspective. Only then will it be able to draw upon more knowledge and expertise than is available here and now in order to select what is appropriate for here and now. It is good practice to allow experts to pause and reflect, but the pause and the reflection have to be well prepared in advance.
The narrative of expertise in the future needs to acknowledge its constituent features: transgressivity, collectivity and the societally distributed nature of its authority. The basis of legitimacy can no longer be derived from outside, but must emanate from the process of knowledge production which is involved. Heterogeneity and societal distribution have become pervasive: heterogeneity of perspectives, of questions and answers, and the social actors involved, and of the interlinkage between private and public. Increasingly, expertise identifies dilemmas without reducing their inherent ambivalence. In this connection, the example of anthropological practice might have something to recommend itself, for in the words of Marilyn Strathern (1997), 'anthropological practice always was the expertise of being in two places at once, here and there, seeing "ourselves" and "others" at the same time. It depended on the perception of a divide that was constantly dissolving and reforming'. If narrative implies prediction, it can only be successful if these features become a recognized part of it. They must be made transparent. In the early phases of modernity, scientific and technical expertise was embedded in a coevolving process of modernization, with the state as a central actor and science and technology being perceived as forces which impact society, but are located outside. In late modernity, together with the retreat of the state as central actor and the concomitant rise of globalized market forces, expertise has become disembedded from the public realm and distributed through society. Its privatization partly amounts to a reappropriation of expertise through lay participants, leaving open the question how a new, publicly acceptable expertise could grow out of the diffusion process and what would be the basis of its legitimacy. Can scientific and technical expertise become re-embedded in wider societal contexts with interconnections that arise and dissolve? Can it fulfil in a different sense what its persuasive narrative offers as prediction: not being in control of the future, but instead a kind of time-released wisdom which can anticipate future uses without being able to predict them?
